Admiralty Law by Cavin, Lyle C., Jr., Esq. & Rush, Philip A.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 18
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey Article 4
January 1988
Admiralty Law
Lyle C. Cavin Jr., Esq.
Philip A. Rush
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Admiralty Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lyle C. Cavin Jr., Esq. and Philip A. Rush, Admiralty Law, 18 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1988).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss1/4
ADMIRALTY LAW 
THE UNSEAWORTHINESS DOCTRINE AND 
SEAMAN'S ASSAULT: NAVIGATING THE 
MUDDY WATERS 
LYLE C. CAVIN, JR., EsQ.- AND PmuP A RUSH--
L INTRODUCTION 
A. THE PURPosE 
This article will propose a set of guideposts or factors for 
use by the Ninth Circuit in determining a vessel owners liability 
under the unseaworthiness doctrine for assaults inflicted by one 
crew member upon another. It will also be suggested that some 
degree of serious injury must be found before imposing liability 
under the doctrine. Additionally, the authors recommend what 
will be termed the "fighting seaman" stereotype be dropped in 
assessing the assaulting seaman's disposition. 
Although primary emphasis is placed on Ninth Circuit deci-
sions, an analysis of other Circuits will be made as a comparison 
and to provide background for this subject. Additionally, it 
should be noted that personal injury claims resulting from ship-
board ass&ult may generally state three causes of action:1 1) un-
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sp,aworthiness~ 2) negligence (Jones Act);a and 3) maintenance 
and cure.4 However, 88 this article focuses on unseaworthiness, 
issues arising under the negligence and maintenance and cure 
claims will only be discussed in broad terms. 
B. OvERVIEW 
The warranty of seaworthiness provides that the shipowner 
has a non-delegable dutya to provide the crew with a vessel and 
gear in seaworthy condition, such that the vessel and appurte-
nant equipment are reasonably fit for their intended purpose.' 
The warranty is absolute and completely divorced from concepts 
of negligence.' As applied to crew members the shipowner war-
rants the seaman to be of equal disposition and seamanship to 
ordinary men in the calling.' 
The above rule reflects a strong policy recognizing the in-
herently hazardous conditions a seaman is continuously sub-
jected to in his work environment.· As such, the Court has deter-
mined under proper circumstance that the shipowner is better 
2. For a general discussion on the unseaworthiness claim. &ee G. GU.NORB AND C. 
BLACK. TIm LAw or ADMIRALTY § 6-38, at 383 (2d. ed. 1975) [hereinafter Gu.wOKB & 
BLACK). 
3. 46 U.s.C. § 688 (1982). See generally GU.NORB & BLACK, &upra note 2, § 6-20, at 
325. Aho &ee BBNBDICT ON ADMIRALTY, &upra note I, § 2, at 1-7. 
4. For a general discussion on maintenance and cure, &ee Gu.wORB & BLACK, &upra 
note 2, § 6-6, at 281. See aho BBNBDICT ON ADMIRALTY, &upra note I, § 42, at 4-5. 
5. Mahnich v. Southern S.s. Co .. 321 U.s. 96, 102 (1944). 
6. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.s. 539, 550 (1960). 
7. Delivering the opinion for the Court, Justice Rutledge discusses the absolute na-
ture of unseaworthiness: 
It is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous 
to other well lcnown instances in our law. Derived from and 
shaped to meet the hazards which performing the service im-
poses, the liability is neither limited by conceptions of negli-
gence nor contractual in character. (citations omitted). It is a 
form of absolute duty owing to all within the ran!1e of its hu-
manitarian policy. 
Seas Shipping v. Sieracki, 328 U.s. 85, 94-95 (1946). 
See aho Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500 (1971), where the Court 
distinguishes between personal acta of instantaneous negligence and negligence in creat-
ing an unseaworthy condition. 
S. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.s. Co., 348 U.s. 336, 337 (1955), approving Keen v. 
Overseas Tanbhip Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 518 (1952). 
9. Mahnich v. Southern S.s. Co., 321 U.s. 96, 103-04 (1944). See aho infra note 30 
and accompanying text. 
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suited to pass the risk of loss to the shipping community (who 
benefits from the seaman's services), rather than imposing the 
brunt of loss solely on the injured seaman.10 
In determining whether the shipowner's warranty of seawor-
thiness has been breached by the assaulting seaman, the Su-
preme Court in Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. CO.,II stated: 
The problem, as with many aspects of the law, is 
one of degree. Was the assault within the usual 
and customary standards of the calling? Or is it a 
case of a seaman with a wicked disposition, a pro-
pensity to evil conduct, a savage and vicious na-
ture? If it is the former, it is one of the risks of 
the sea that every crew takes. If the seaman has a 
savage and vicious nature, then the ship becomes 
a perilous place. A vessel bursting at the seams 
might well be a safet place than one with a homi-
cidal maniac as a crew member. Ii 
In plying the murky waters of unseaworthiness the following 
discussion will attempt to assist the Ninth Circuit in distin-
guishing between liability and non-liability under the doctrine. 
For this purpose the remainder of the article will be divided into 
three main topic headings: 1) history and development of the 
unseaworthiness doctrine; 2) a main discussion of proposals; and 
3) a conclusion. 
ll. HISTORY AND DEVELOPEMENT 
A EVOLUTION OF THE UNSEAWOR"I:HINESS DOCTRINE IN RELATION 
TO SEAMAN'S PERSONAL INJURY 
The modem doctrine of unseaworthiness as applied to 
seamen's personal injury has evolved over a period of centu-
ries.1S The exact origins of the doctrine are unclear, although 
10. Seas Shipping v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1946). See also infril notes 31 and 
39 with accompanying text. 
11. 348 U.S. 336 (1955). 
12. ld. at 340. 
13. For a general discussion on the history of the unseaworthiness doctrine in regard 
to seamen's personal injury, ,ee Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 326 U.s. 539, 543-550 (1960). 
See also generally BENEDICT ON ADUIRALTY, ,upra note I, § 23, at 3-16. Additionally, ,ee 
CHAJoILEE, THE ABsoLtmI: WARRANTY or SEAWORTHINESS: A HJsroay AND CoMPARATIVE 
STUDY, 24 MERCER L. REv. 519, 528-29 (1973). 
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mention of it may be found in the early sea codes of continental 
Europe.lf These codes dealt with the seaman's right to mainte-
nance and cure when injured in the service of the vessel Ia 
During the early 19th century, American courts extended 
the doctrine to encompass the seaman's wage claim for abandon-
ment of an unseaworthy vessel U During the later part of that 
century the doctrine was further extended to recovery for per-
sonal injury.17 These early cases imposed a negligence "due dili-
gence" standard on the shipowner to provide a seaworthy ves-
sel.ll Under the negligence standard a seaman could not recover 
for injuries caused by a hazardous condition of which the ves-
sel's owner or ship's officers were neither actually nor construc-
tively aware. lit 
Courts recognizing the seaman's unique and inherently haz-
ardous work environment began to unravel the negligence strand 
from the unseaworthiness claim beginning with the famous Os-
ceola dicta in 1903.'0 In the subsequent case of Carlisle Packing 
Co. v. Sandanger,Sl the Court suggested that the vessel in ques-
tion may have been unseaworthy at the time she left the dock 
without regard to negligence. is This was taken by subsequent 
courts and commentators as imposing an absolute duty on the 
part of the shipowner detached from any concepts of 
negligence.2lI 
14. Michell, 362 u.s. at 543. 
15. ld. at 543. 
16. ld. at 544. 
17.ld. 
la ld. 
19. See BENEllIcr ON ADWlRALTY, 8upra note I, § 23. at 3-19. 
20. Although suLjed to much debate, considering the historical context of the opin-
ion, Justice Brown, states in dicta: 
Upon full review, however, of English and American authori-
ties upon these questions, we believe the law may be consid-
ered 88 settled upon the following propoeitions: 
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and 
American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by 
seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of ship or a 
failure to supply and keep in order the proper app1ianC7~ ap-
purtenant to the ship.[etation omitted]. 
The Osceola, 189 U.s. 158, 175 (1903). 
21. 259 U.s. 255 (1922). 
22. ld. at 259. 
23. See generally discussion of unseaworthinesa after the Osceola in Mitchell v. 
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By 1944, the Supreme Court in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. 
Co.," set the course for the modem day doctrine of seaworthi-
ness regarding personal injury recovery, by expressly stating its 
suggestion in Carlisle Packing CO.,A that the shipowner has an 
absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel without' regard to 
negligence. From Mahnich and subsequent refinements, the 
modem rule of seaw.orthiness may be stated as a non-delegable 
duty" by the shipowner to provide the crew with a vessel and 
gear in a seaworthy condition, such that the vessel is reasonably 
fit for her intended purpose.S7 This duty is absolute and com-
pletely divorced from concepts of negligence. A 
The strong policy behind the rule recognizes that seamen 
are generally powerless" to protect themselves from the inher-
ent hazards of their living and work environment. at) Risk of loss 
Trawler Racer, 362 U.s. 539, 545-550 (1960). 
24. 321 U.s. 96 (1944). 
25. rd. at 100·02. 
26. rd. at 102. 
'J:1. Mitchell, 362 U.s. at 550. 
28. See infra note 8. 
29. 46 USC § 11501 (1983) provides in relevant pam: 
Penalties for specified offenses.. 
When a seaman lawfully engaged commits any of the fol· 
lowing offenses, the seaman shall be punished as specified: 
(4) For willful disobedience to a lawful command at sea, 
the seaman, at the discretion of the master, may be confiDed 
until the disobedience ends, and on arrival in port forfeits 
from the seaman's wages not more than "' days payor, at the 
discretion of the court, may be imprisoned for not more than 
one month. 
(5) For continued willful disobedience to a lawful com· 
mand or continued willful neglect at sea, the seaman, at the 
discretion of the master, may be confined, on water and 1,000 
calories, with run rations every 5th day, until the disobedience 
ends, and on arrival in port forfeits, for each 24 hours' contino 
uance of the disobedience or neglect. not more than 12 days' 
payor, at the discretion of the court, may be imprisoned for 
not more than 3 months. 
(6) For assaulting a master, mate, pilot, engineer, or staff 
officer, the seaman shall be imprisoned for not more than 2 
years. 
30. In discussing the underlying policy of the unseaworthiness doctrine, Justice 
Stone states: 
We have often had occuion to emphasize the conditions of the 
seaman's employment (citation omitted), which have been 
deemed to make him a ward of the admiralty and to place a 
large responsibility for his safety on the owner. He is subject 
5
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for injuries resulting from hazardous conditions will pass to the 
shipOwner who spreads the loss to the shipping industry as a 
whole, which benefits from the seaman's services under hazard-
ous conditions.'1 It was against this backdrop that the courts be-
gan extending the warranty of seaworthiness to include the 
ship's crew. . 
B. THE UNSEAWORTHINESS DOCTRINE AND A$SAULT BETWEEN CREW 
MEMBERS 
In Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp.," the plaintiff origi-
nally brought suit under an unseaworthiness and negligence 
claim for injuries resulting from an unprovoked attack with a 
meat cleaver by a fellow crew member." Judge Learned Hand 
reversed the district court judgment for defendant and ordered a 
new triaL" Noting the general warranty of seaworthiness ex-
tended to both patent and latent defects in the vessel's hull and 
to the rigorous discipline of the sea, and all the conditions of 
hiJ ae:vice constrain him to accept. without critical examina-
tion and without protest. working conditiona and appliances as 
commanded by his superior officers. These conditions. which 
have generated the exacting requirement that the veaael or the 
owner must provide the seaman with seaworthy appliances 
with which to do his work. likewise require that safe appli-
ances be furniahed when and where the work is to be done. 
Mahnich v. Southern S.s. Co., 321 U.s. 96, 103-04 (1944). 
31. In d!acuaaing the shipowner/crew member relationship, Justice Rutledge, deliv-
ering the opinion for the Court. stated: 
[The] helplessness of [seamen] to ward off [marine hazards] 
and the harahness of forcing them to shoulder alone the re-
sulting personal disability and looa. have been thought to jus-
tify and to require putting their burden, in so far u it is mea-
surable in money, upon the owner regardleu of hiJ fault 
[footnote]. Those risb are avoidable by the owner to the ex-
tent that they may result from negligence. ADd beyond this he 
is in poeition, as the worker is not. to distribute the 10lIl in the 
shipping community which receives the service and should 
bear ita cost. 
These and other considerations arising from the hazards 
which maritime service placea upon men who perform it. 
rather than any consensual baai.a of responsibility, have been 
the paramount inBuences dictating the shipowner" liability 
for unseaworthiness as well as ita absolute character. 
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.s. 85, 93-94 (1946). 
32. 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952). 
33. Ide at 516. 
34. Ide at 519. 
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gear Judge Hand stated: 
[W] e can see no reason for saying that, although 
the owner is liable if the ship's plates35 are started 
without his knowledge, he is not liable if he signs 
on a homicidal paranoiac, whose appearance does 
not betray his disposition.36 
7 
In extending the warranty of seaworthiness to include the 
vessel's crew, Judge Hand stated that the warranty was "not 
that the seaman is competent to meet all contingencies; but that 
he is equal in disposition and seamanship to ordinary men in the 
calling."37 Thus, if the assaulting seaman's disposition fell below 
that of the ordinary seaman, his unequal disposition constitutes 
a "defective" condition for which the shipowner will be held 
strictly liable. 
Consistent with the policy as stated in Mahnich and subse-
quent decisions,38 the court stressed that the injured seaman 
should not bear the risk of loss as a result of an inherently dan-
gerous condition (the unequally disposed seaman), even where 
the owner had used due diligence in selecting a crew.39 Risk of 
35. A "plate" generally refers to a fiat piece of steel used in shipbuilding. Its name 
will vary depending on use (e.g., "tank top plating", plating used to form the top of a 
double bottom; or "deck plating", plating used to form the deck). "Plates", as Judge 
Hand used the term, appears to refer to the hull plating or plating that forms the skin of 
the ship. See generally E. TuRPIN AND W. McEWEN, MERCHANT MARINE OFFICERS' HAND-
BOOK, at 14-32 (1965), and W. EDDINGTON. GLOSSARY OF SHIPBUILDING AND OUTFITTING 
TERMS, at 210 (1944). 
36. Id. at 518. 
37.Id. 
38. See supra notes 30 and 31. 
39. Judge Learned Hand, speaking to fears that adoption of such a rule would shut 
down the shipping industry, states: 
As for the fears of the judge [in adopting this rule] in the case 
at bar which we have just mentioned, we can see no antece-
dent reason to assume that after the owner has used due care 
in selecting the crew, they will in many instances turn out not 
to be up to the ordinary measure of the calling. But suppose 
there will be many such instances; that is no reason why an 
individual seaman who has suffered because his fellow is not 
up to his work, must bear the loss. Substantially all maritime 
risks are insured, and if we must suppose that the addition of 
this risk will show in the premiums, in the end it will show in 
freight rates; and so far as it does, the recovery will be spread 
among those who use the ships. As we have said, this has been 
the uniform practice when the injury has arisen from defects 
7
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loss is passed to the shipowner and any increase in freight fares, 
as a result of increased insurance premiums, would be spread 
among those who use such services.40 
A qualification to Keen appeared the following year in 
Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. CO.41 In Jones, the plaintiff seaman 
brought an unseaworthiness claim for injuries sustained when 
his roommate beat him, resulting in a broken hip.42 The beating 
took place without apparent provocation although the two had 
argued several hours earlier.43 The trial court held the roommate 
was of unequal disposition under the Keen standard, thus 
breaching the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness.44 
On appeal Judge Learned Hand reversed.41i Finding the 
owner would not be held liable for every "sailors' brawl",46 the 
court refined the meaning of the seaman's disposition by stating 
that: 
[A]ll men are to some degree irascible ... 
[but] ... [s]ailors lead a rough life and are more 
apt to use their fists than office employees; what 
will seem to sedentary and protected persons an 
insufficient provocation for a personal encounter, 
is not the measure of the "disposition" of "the or-
dinary men in the calling."47 
In other words, what may appear to an office worker insuffi-
cient provocation for a fist fight, could be sufficient provocation 
for a seaman. Thus, Jones added a new qualification in assessing 
the assaulting seaman's disposition. 
In conclusion, the court found the assailant had not 
breached the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness.48 Addition-
in material; and we have yet to learn that hull and gear are 
less likely to fail under stress than those who handle both. 
Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1952). 
40.Id. 
41. 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1953). 
42. Id. at 817. 
43. Id. at 816. 
44.Id. 
45. Id. at 817. 
46.Id. 
47. Id. at 817. 
48. Id. In reversing Judge Hand states: "Such a set-to seldom results in serious in-
8
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ally, the court noted in other cases of this type, a prior history of 
violent behavior, use of a weapon, or worse, had been shown 
before liability was imposed.49 Keen and Jones became the foun-
dation cases for the Supreme Court in Boudoin two years later. 
In Boudoin, a heavily intoxicated crew member snuck into 
the plaintiff's room to steal a bottle of liquor.llo When the plain-
tiff awoke the assailant beat him over the head with a bottle 
causing severe injuries.lIl Shortly after the attack the assailant 
came back with a knife intending to inflict further injury on the 
plaintiff.1I2 Mter threatening the mate, the assailant left the ves-
sel without permission to obtain more alcohol.II3 The master 
eventually placed him in irons and subsequently discharged him 
from the vessel. lI4 
In affirming the trial court's finding of unseaworthiness the 
Court stated: 
We see no reason to draw a line between the ship 
and the gear on the one hand and the ship's per-
sonnel on the other [footnote]. A seaman with a 
proclivity for assaulting people may, indeed, be a 
more deadly risk than a rope with a weak strand 
or a hull with a latent defect. GG 
Attempting to draw a line between breach and non-breach 
of warranty, the Court distinguished between "an assault within 
the usual and customary standards of the calling" and one com-
jury, when only fists are used, and we are to judge Hunter's disposition, not by the fact 
that the plaintiff broke his hip, but by what would ordinarily follow from what he did." 
Id. at 817. 
Curiously, it would appear from the majority of subsequent case law that the facts in 
Jones would result in breach of warranty. See, e.g., infra, note 73 and accompanying 
text. 
See also, T. SCHOENBAUM. ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, (1987), §53, at 167, where 
proximate causation under the unseaworthiness doctrine is viewed in the traditional 
sense, such that: "(1) the unseaworthiness played a substantial part in bringing about or 
actually causing the injury and that (2) the injury was either a direct result or a reasona-
bly probable consequence of the unseaworthiness." 
49. Id. 
50. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 337. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 338. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 339. 
9
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mitted by "a seaman with a wicked disposition, a propensity to 
evil conduct, a savage and vicious nature."56 If the former, the 
seaman bore the risk of 10ss.57 If the latter, the shipowner bore 
the risk. 58 The Court additionally adopted the Jones qualifica-
tion in assessing the seaman's disposition such that it must be 
bore in mind that seamen are more easily provoked than office 
workers.59 
The trial court found the assailant of unequal disposition by 
evidence that he was "a person of violent character, belligerent 
disposition, excessive drinking habits, disposed to fighting and 
making threats and assaults."60 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court decision, finding the assailant had crossed the line, 
and breached the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness.61, 
III. MAIN DISCUSSION 
A. AIDS TO NAVIGATION 
1. Analogy to criminal "aggravated assault" 
One of the simpler rules of prudent navigation is to know 
where you are and where you are going. The discussion up to 
this point has focused on the first part of our prudent navigation 
rule, where are we? 
The Court in Boudoin, asks us to distinguish between "an 
assault within the usual and customary standards of the calling" 
commonly referred to as the "sailors' brawl",62 and the case of 
56. [d. at 340. 
57. [d. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. at 339, citing to Jones with approval. 
60. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 112 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. La. 1953), rev'd, 221 
F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 336 (1955). 
61. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 340. 
62. [d. at 339. It would appear that "sailors' brawl" is a term of art not susceptible 
to easy definition. In Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1953), the 
court stated a shipowner would not be liable for "injuries resulting from every sailors' 
brawl." Interpreting this statement, one might conclude if the shipowner is not liable for 
injuries resulting from every "sailors' brawl," then there might be some sailors' brawls 
where he is liable. Whatever Judge Hand meant by "sailors' brawl", some courts have 
equated it with an "assault within the usual and customary standards of the calling." 
See Stechcon v. United States, 439 F.2d 972, 794 (9th Cir. 1971), where the court states 
"[tJhe record before us conclusively shows that appellant's injuries were not sustained in 
10
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an assault where the assailant possesses "a wicked disposition, a 
propensity to evil conduct, a savage and vicious nature."63 In 
breaking this proposition down into components, lets first begin 
with the term "assault". 
Assault is often used as a generic term for the two distinct 
actions of assault and battery.54 Assault in terms of a specific 
tort, is intent to inflict apprehension of a harmful or offensive 
contact, where battery is the actual physical completion of the 
assault.65 
a 'sailor's brawl' ••.• " See also Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 F. Supp. 625, 627 
(E.D. Va. 1965). 
63. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 340. 
64. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 46 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]: 
The two terms [of assault and battery] are so closely associ-
ated in common usage that they are generally used together, 
or regarded as more or less synonymous [footnote]. Loosely 
drawn criminal statutes, which make use of "assault" to in-
clude·attempted battery, or even battery itself, have assisted 
in obscuring the distinction. 
See also, W. LA FAYE AND A SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, § 7.14(a), at 684 (2d ed. 1986) [here-
inafter LA FAYE]: 
(a) Assault and Battery Distinguished. 
Although the word "assault" is sometimes used loosely to in-
clude a battery, and the whole expression "assault and bat-
tery" to mean battery [footnote], it is more accurate to distin-
guish between the two separate crimes, assault and battery, on 
the basis of the existence or non-existence of physical injury 
or offensive touching. Battery requires such an injury or 
touching. Assault, on the other hand, needs no such physical 
contact ...• 
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 1965): 
Section 13. Battery: Harmful Contact 
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if 
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive con-
tact with the person of the other or a third person, or an im-
minent apprehension of such a contact, and 
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly 
or indirectly results. 
See also 3 E. DEVITT, C. BLACKMAR AND M WOLFF, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS § 81.01, at 196 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONS]: 
Intentional Tort - "assault" - "battery" - defined. 
The law protects the physical integrity of every person 
from all unnecessary and unwarranted violation or 
interference. 
Any intentional attempt or threat to inflict injury upon 
the person of another, when coupled with an apparent present 
ability to do so, and an intentional display of force such as 
11
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Assuming the shipboard assault includes both intent to 
cause offensive touching and actual offensive touching66 then 
"an assault within the usual and customary standards of the 
calling," must in the minimum, be some type of battery.67 If this 
first type of assault is a battery, then the second type of assault 
of which the Court speaks, must also a battery, but with some-
thing mor_e. Something more, the Court tells us is "a wicked dis-
position, a propensity to evil conduct, a savage and vicious 
nature."68 
Focusing on the assaulting seaman's disposition the Court 
appears to be looking for a greater evil intent on the part of the 
assaulting seaman before finding him "defective" in terms of the 
warranty of seaworthiness. However, in determining intent we 
must focus on the circumstances surrounding the assault and the 
resulting harm.69 
would give the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bod-
ily harm, constitutes an "assault." An "assault" may be com-
mitted without actually touching, or striking, or doing bodily 
harm to the person of another. 
Any intentional use of force upon the person of another is 
a "battery." So, the least intentional touching of the person of 
another, if accompanied by an intentional use or display of 
force such as would give the victim reason to fear or expect 
immediate bodily harm, constitutes a "battery." 
See also, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 64, at 39. 
66. Nearly all cases in this area involve some degree of intentional offensive contact. 
See, e.g., cases cited infra note 73. 
67. Intentional offensive touching meeting the requirements of battery as defined 
supra note 65. See also, 22 ALR3d 624, 657, where the editors distinguish between the 
"ordinary assault" and assault by a seaman with a wicked, evil, vicious or savage 
disposition. 
68. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 340. 
69. See FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 63, at 197: 
Intent - Defined - Proof of 
Intent ordinarily may not be proved directly because 
there is no way of fathoming or scrutinizing the operations of 
the human mind. But you may infer a person's intent from 
surrounding circumstances. You may consider any statement 
made or act done or omitted by a party whose intent is in 
issue, and all other facts and circumstances which indicate his 
state of mind. 
You may consider it reasonable to draw the inference and 
find that a person intends the natural and probable conse-
quences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. It is for 
you to decide what facts have been established by the 
evidence. 
See also Golden v. Sommers, 56 F.R.D. 3 (M.D. Pa. 1972) aff'd, 481 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 
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Under maritime criminal statutes for assaults, a similar dis-
tinction is made between the level of sanction imposed by exam-
ining the resulting harm to the victim. The misdemeanor crime 
or what might be termed "simple assault", includes assault by 
striking, beating, or wounding.70 The felony crime or what might 
be termed "aggravated assault",71 includes assault resulting in 
serious bodily injury.72 
1973)("reckIess" under certain circumstance may equal intent, if the evidence supports 
such a finding). 
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(d)(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1)(F)-
(I) (Supp. IV 1986), which defines 18 U.S.C. § 113(d)(e) as misdemeanors. 18 U.S.C. § 
113 states in its relevant parts: 
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States, is guilty of an assault shall be pun-
ished as follows: 
(d) Assault by striking, beating, or wounding, by fine of 
not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than six 
months, or both. 
(e) Simple assault, by fine of not more than $300 or im-
prisonment for not more than three months, or both. 
See also United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016 
(assault by striking, beating or wounding is the equivalent of a simple battery. No partic-
ular degree of severity in injury required, nor specific intent as required by the more 
serious offenses under the section). 
71. In discussing aggravated battery see LA FAVE AND SCOIT, supra note 64, at 684, 
where the authors state "Although the common law created the twin crimes (misdemean-
ors) of assault and battery, in modem times legislatures have added the more serious 
crimes (felonies) of aggravated assault and batteries (eg. assault, battery with intent to 
kill ..• , assault, battery with a dangerous weapon). 
The authors also state "[a]ll jurisdictions have statutes, variously worded, which de-
fine aggravated batteries and punish them as felonies [footnote]. Traditionally, the most 
common statute of this type was one covering "assault [footnote] with intent to murder" 
(or to kill, or to do great bodily injury, ... or commit mayhem). [d. at 688. 
72. 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)-(c)(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1)(A)-
(E) (Supp. IV 1986), which defines crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)-(c)(f) as felonies. 18 
U.S.C. § 113(a)-(c)(f) states in its relevant part: 
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States, is guilty of an assault shall be pun-
ished as follows: 
(a) Assault with intent to commit murder, by imprison-
ment for not more than twenty years. 
(b) Assault with intent to commit any felony, except mur-
der or a felony under chapter 109A, by fine of not more than 
$3,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. 
(c) Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do 
bodily harm, and without just cause or excuse, by fine of not 
more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than five 
years, or both. 
(f) Assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by fine of not 
13
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Although a higher degree of bodily injury is not an ex-
pressed requirement of Boudoin, there are several inferences 
that suggest it is. First, as a term of art, Judge Hand's "sea-
mans' brawl" describes the common physical encounters be-
tween fighting seamen. In stating the shipowner is not liable for 
every seamans' brawl, the inference is made that something 
more serious must result before liability will be imposed. 
Second, the Court in Boudoin uses the adjectives "wicked, 
evil, savage and vicious" in describing the disposition of the as-
saulting seaman. An attack by an individual possessing such a 
mental state again infers a serious resulting injury. Third, the 
majority of case law in this area suggests that a higher degree of 
physical harm must be present before liability will be imposed.73 
In decisions favorable to plaintiff the injuries have generally en-
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten 
years, or both. 
73. See, e.g., the following cases resulting in favorable decisions for plaintiff, where a 
higher degree of resulting harm is found: Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 
(1955)(unprovoked attack with bottle caiIsing serious injury); Deakle v. John E. Graham 
& Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985)(unprovoked stabbing resulting in extended hospi-
talization); Pashby v. Universal Dredging Corp., 608 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1979)(attack 
with 18" eyebolt causing injuries to head, leg, and hand); Calcagni v. Hudson Waterways 
Corp., 630 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1979)(attack with wheel wrench; plaintiff incurred various 
bruises and lacerations); Smith v. Lauritzen, 356 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1966)(attack with 
cargo hooks causing severe head injuries); Horton v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 326 
F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964)(unprovoked attack using broken bottle and teeth; plaintiff hospi-
talized); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1963)(attack from 
behind with spear causing punctured lung and severing two ribs); Kelcy v. Tankers Co., 
217 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1954)(plaintiff attacked by assailant, causing cut over left eye, 
bloody nose, cuts" around mouth and damaged dentures); Keen v. Overseas Tankship 
Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952)(unprovoked attack with meat cleaver causing serious 
head injuries); Handley v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)(stab wound 
to abdomen, plaintiff hospitalized); Bartholomew v. Universe Tankers, 168 F. Supp. 155 
(S.D.N.Y. 1957)(unprovoked attack with fists and feet; plaintiff trampled); Thompson v. 
Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. Supp. 838 (D.N.J. 1954)(plaintiff attacked from behind with meat 
cleaver; severe injuries to head). 
In the following cases, plaintiff failed to establish unseaworthiness under fact pat-
terns where lesser degrees of resulting harm was found: Lambert v. Morania Oil Tanker 
Corp., 677 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1982)(assailant hit plaintiff with fists and foot); Schultz v. 
Evelyn Jewell, Inc., 476 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1973)(assault on shrimp boat; no serious in-
jury reported by the court); Kirsch v. United States, 450 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1971)(plain-
tiff struck twice with fists, was able to work rest of voyage); Boorus v. West Coast Trans-
Oceanic, 299 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1962)(fist fight between crew members; no injury seen or 
reported); Stankiewicz v. United Fruit S.S. Corp., 299 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1956)(assailant 
hit plaintiff with jacket zipper); Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 191 
(2d Cir. 1952)(assailant hit plaintiff with fists; no corroborated evidence of serious in-
jury); Kuhl v. Manhattan Tankers Co., 1972 A.M.C. 236 (E.D. Va. 1972)(plaintiff claims 
struck in face by chief mate, no medical attention sought). 
14
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tailed serious injury, debilitation and or medical attention.'14 
In sum, by drawing an analogy from the criminal code it 
would appear that case law under the unseaworthiness claim has 
grafted a type of civil "aggravated battery" into the general mar-
itime law couched in unseaworthiness language. As such, al-
though not directly addressed by the Court in Boudoin, a strong 
inference can be made that similar to criminal aggravated as-
sault a higher degree of resulting harm must be found before the 
seaman will be found to be unequally disposed. 
Caution should be exercised though in keeping the two bod-
ies of general maritime law and criminal code separate and dis-
tinct. First, the doctrine of unseaworthiness is not controlled by 
the criminal statute.'16 Additionally, the underlying principle of 
criminal law is to protect the public as a whole, where the pri-
mary purpose of unseaworthiness is to compensate the individ-
ual seaman for injuries incurred.'18 However, given this caution-
ary note the analogy may still prove useful as a reference point 
in distinguishing the "sailors' brawl" and assault by the' un-
equally disposed seaman, by focusing on the resulting harm. 
2. The fighting seaman stereotype 
A second murky area is the Jones qualification on seamen's 
disposition. In Jones, the court makes two statements emphasiz-
ing the plaintiff's heavy burden in proving that the assault went 
beyond the "usual and customary standards of the calling."'1'1 
First, the court states that in determining the seaman's disposi-
tion it must be bore in mind that they are more easily provoked 
to fight than ordinary office workers.'18 Later the opinion states 
"in other decisions of this sort the assault has been either with a 
weapon, or the assailant has been independently shown to have 
been exceptionally quarrelsome, or worse."'19 
74. See generally, supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
75. On a plain reading, 18 U.S.C. § 113 has no application to the unseaworthiness 
claim. 
76. See generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §2, at 7 (4th ed. 
1971). 
77. Jones, 204 F.2d at 817. 
78. Id. at 817. 
79. Id. 
15
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Both statements speak to the plaintiff's heavy burden in 
proving unequal disposition, but on what foundations are they 
based? The latter statement cites a string of cases to back up 
the proposition. so The former statement cites no statistical or 
case authority. One could speculate that the statement may be a 
product of an antiquated stereotype of seamen as brawlers. 
Apparently, the court in Jones felt the Keen standard drift-
ing away from the pier and decided to tightened up on the 
shorelines in order to bring the vessel back alongside. Unfortu-
nately, it seems they took in too tight on the head line (with the 
fighting seaman stereotype), thus leaving the stern out in the 
stream. Most courts have been able to steer clear of the hazard 
created by stereotyping, hopefully recognizing its underlying in-
tent by focusing on plaintiff's heavy burden more than the truth 
of the statement itself. 
As the stereotype of the fighting seaman appears based 
more in fiction than fact, is it useful to retain it? Removal would 
not appear to conflict with policy considerations in protecting 
the. seaman's risk of loss in an inherently dangerous environ-
ment.S1 Additionally, by removing the stereotype, the equal dis-
position of seamen can be judged in its present day 20th Cen-
tury context. S2 For these reasons the Ninth Circuit should 
dismiss Judge Hand's caricature as an unfortunate choice of 
words; however, his underlying intent of plaintiff's heavy burden 
in proving unequal disposition should be retained. 
B. GUIDEPOSTS 
Up to this point we have basically dealt with the Keen, 
Jones and Boudoin trilogy that leaves us a policy, a rule, and a 
brief list of factors as guidelines. 
80. [d. at 817, citing Keen v. Overseas Tankship Co., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952); 
Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1945); Koehler v. Presque-Isle Trans-
portation Co., 141 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1944); The Rolph, 299 F. 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1924). 
81. See supra notes 30 and 31. 
82. For an example of how the stereotype works, see Hildebrand v. S.S. Com-
mander, 247 F. Supp 625, 627 (E.D. Va. 1965), where the court states that the assailant 
acted without "intoxicating beverages so frequently leading to the typical sailors brawl." 
The publishing headnotes naturally interpreted this as a "drunken sailors brawl." 
16
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The policy recognizes inherent hazards in the seaman's 
unique work environment over which he has little controp3 The 
risk of loss will pass to the shipowner for seamen's injuries re-
sulting from hazardous conditions on board the vesseP4 The 
shipowner will in turn spread the loss among the shipping indus-
try who benefit from performance of the seaman's services under 
the hazardous conditions.85 
The policy is implemented via the shipowner's warranty of 
seaworthiness. Under the warranty, the shipowner has an abso-
lute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel such that the vessel and 
appurtenant gear are reasonably fit for their intended purpose.86 
The warranty has been extended to include the vessel's crew 
members.87 In the context of seamen, the shipowner warrants 
him to be of equal disposition to other ordinary seamen of the 
calling.88 
In determining whether a seaman possesses an unequal dis-
position at the time of the assault, thus breaching the ship-
owner's warranty, we are called on to distinguish between an as-
sault within the "usual and customary standards of the calling" 
and an assault by a seaman with a wicked and vicious disposi-
tion.89 A useful analogy in distinguishing the two situations may 
be drawn from the criminal law distinction between "simple as-
sault" and "aggravated assault", where the aggravated assault 
requires a higher degree of resulting injury. 
In Boudoin and Jones the respective courts developed a 
short list of relevant factors to aide in determining whether the 
assaulting seaman possessed an unequal disposition. The Su-
preme Court in Boudoin found factors such as violent character, 
belligerent disposition, excessive drinking habits, disposed to 
fighting, and making threats and assaults to be significant in de-
termining disposition.90 In Jones, the court suggested the use of 
83. See supra notes 30 and 31 with accompanying text. 
84. See supra notes 30, 31, and 39 with accompanying text. 
85.Id. 
86. Mahnich, 321 U.S. at 102; Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 539; Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 94-95; 
Usner, 400 U.S. at 500. 
87. See supra note 8. 
88. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 339. 
89. Id. at 340. 
90.Id. 
17
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a weapon, exceptionally quarrelsome behavior, or worse was 
needed.91 
Combining the Boudoin and Jones factors into excessive in-
toxication, history of prior assaults or aggressive behavior, use of 
a weapon, or worse, is useful but lacking as a comprehensive list. 
Fortunately, subsequent circuit decisions have fleshed out sev-
eral more factors that add to the laundry list. Pulling together 
and analyzing all the various cases has lead the authors to pro-
pose nine significant factors that should be examined in making 
a determination of the unseaworthiness claim. The list includes; 
1) provocation, 2) injury, 3) prior and subsequent acts, 4) in-
toxication, 5) use of a weapon, 6) physical differences, 7) self-
defense, 8) warning, and 9) conduct of superiors. 
If one accepts the arguments and discussion up to this point 
then the following will probably appear to be nothing more than 
common sense guidelines. The proposed guideposts are by no 
means exhaustive, but they do suggest some recurring themes 
that the Ninth Circuit as well as other circuits have considered 
important. As it is doubtful that any two assaults will occur in 
the same manner, different factors may be given more or less 
weight than suggested here. It is in the end a judgment call, it is 
hoped the following proposed guidelines may prove helpful in 
that determination. 
1. Provocation. If one may infer that a person who attacks 
without provocation possesses violent tendencies, then provoca-
tion may become an important factor in distinguishing between 
equal and unequal disposition. In Pashby v. Universal Dredging 
Corp.,92 plaintiff was assaulted in an unprovoked rear attack by 
a deckhand using an 18" eyebolt.93 The court reversed summary 
judgment for defendant finding that the nature of the assault 
raised material issues to the claim.94 
A similar result was reached in Stechcon v. United States,9" 
91. Jones, 204 F.2d at 817. 
92. 608 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1979). 
93. Id. at 1313. 
94. Id. at 1314. 
95. 439 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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in an unprovoked attack from rear with fists.96 Here the court 
found the assault conclusively not of the "sailor's brawl" type, 
and reversed summary judgment for defendant.9 '1 In sum, a lack 
of provocation would appear to be a strong inference of unequal 
disposition in the Ninth Circuit.98 
On the flip side, district court decisions within the Ninth 
Circuit have found that a provoking seaman should not benefit 
from his own wrongdoing as evidenced in Watson v. The Letita 
Lykes,99 and Palmer v. Apex Marine Corp.IOO In Watson, the 
overwhelming evidence showed plaintiff provoked the fight and 
the other seaman only acted in self defense.lol In Palmer, the 
court dismissed plaintiff's unseaworthiness claim where the evi-
dence showed plaintiff provoked an attack on his watch partner 
who possessed no apparent propensities toward evil conduct.lo2 
Additionally, where there is mutual provocation as in 
Boorus v. West Coast Trans-Oceanic S.S. Line,103 and Mon-
96. [d. at 794. 
97. [d. 
98. For similar result in other circuits where little or no provocation was found, see 
Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985)(unprovoked attack 
from rear with a knife); Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 578 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 
1978)(unprovoked fatal attack from rear with 10" bait knife); Horton v. Moore-McCor-
mack Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1964)(unprovoked attack by assailant with 
broken glass, a bottle and biting with his teeth); Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 F. 
Supp. 625 (E.D. Va. 1965)(unprovoked attack by second mate on third mate after third 
mate refused to stand second mate's watch); Bartholomew v. Universe Tanker, Inc., 168 
F. Supp. 155, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)(unprovoked attack; assailant trampled and beat plain-
tiff with fists and then attempted to throw him over the side). 
99. 135 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Cal. 1955). 
100. 510 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Wash. 1981). 
101. Watson, 135 F. Supp. at 934. 
102. Palmer, 510 F. Supp. at 73. For similar cases where evidence showed plaintiff 
may have provoked attack, see Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99, 104 (6th Cir. 
1978)(plaintiff's provocation coupled with the fact that assailant hit him in non-vital 
areas plus assailant's good record did not support a conclusion of savage disposition); 
Smith v. American Mail Lines, Ltd., 525 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1975)(court speculates that 
plaintiff's deceased may have provoked attack); Robinson v. 8.S. Atlantic Sterling, 369 
F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1967)(plaintiff captain provoked messman into violent attack with 
knife); McConville v. Florida Towing Corp., 321 F.2d 162, 164-65 (1st Cir. 1963)(court 
finds plaintiff's own misconduct and provocation the sole proximate cause of his inju-
ries); Stankiewicz v. United Fruit S.S. Corp., 229 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1956)(inference (dis-
cussed under negligence claim) that plaintiff had tied assailant's clothes in knots prior to 
assailant striking plaintiff with his jacket); Kuhl v. Manhattan Tankers Co., 1972 A.M.C. 
236, 239-40 (E.D. Va. 1972)(plaintiff bosun habitually drunk and argumentative pro-
voked chief mate into hitting him). 
103. 299 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1962). 
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plaisir v. Delta S.S. Lines,104 the Ninth Circuit has not imposed 
liability. In Boorus, plaintiff bosun filed an unseaworthiness and 
negligence claim for alleged injuries resulting from a fight with 
the ship's carpenter. 1011 The Ninth Circuit affirmed judgment for 
the shipowner where circumstance suggested both parties were 
protagonists in the fight. lOS 
In Monplaisir, the plaintiff was summoned before a Coast 
Guard administrative hearing after a knife fight, forcing him to 
leave the vessel early.l07 Plaintiff brought suit under an unsea-
worthiness claim for loss of wages and damages alleging that he 
was wrongfully discharged. lOS The district court noted the Coast 
Guard ALJ decision that found both parties to the fight willing 
participants and guilty of misconduct.l09 The district court 
granted summary judgment to defendant finding that plaintiff's 
own misconduct was the substantial factor which lead to his dis-
charge, and not the other party's action.llo 
In addition to the general discussion of provocation above, 
Jones and Boudoin remind us that in determining disposition, 
seamen are more easily provoked than office workers.lll For rea-
sons mentioned earlier the authors feel this caveat should be 
dismissed. Lack of adequate provocation should be viewed in 
terms of the disposition of the present day ordinary seaman, 
without regard to antiquated stereotypes. 
2. Injury. The seriousness and permanent nature of an in-
jury may be a strong indication of the inflicting party's disposi-
tion. Again, drawing an analogy from criminal "aggravated as-
sault" statutes, it appears the circuits are looking for serious 
104. 1983 A.M.C. 694 (N.D. Cal. 1983). 
105. Boorus, 299 F.2d at 893. 
106. [d. at 894-95. 
107. Monplaisir, 1983 A.M.C. at 695. 
108. [d. at 694. 
109. [d. at 695. 
110. [d. at 698. See also Connolly v. Farrell Lines Inc., 268 F.2d 653 (lst Cir. 
1959)(plaintiff accuses assailant of not paying debts in dice game; assailant charges 
plaintiff; plaintiff later advances on assailant with broken bottle); Gulledge v. United 
States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187 (E.D. Penn. 1972)(conflicting evidence as to who was the ag-
gressor). See also Holmes v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 301 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 802 (1962)(self inflicted amputation of right hand due to plaintiff's own 
mental delusion did not render vessel unseaworthy). 
111. Jones, 204 F.2d at 817. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 339. 
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bodily injury in distinguishing between the "sailor's brawl" and 
the assault committed with a "wicked and savage disposition." 
However, factors such as provocation and causation may lessen 
its affect. ll2 
In Smith v. American Mail Line, Ltd.,1l3 plaintiff's de-
ceased was murdered by an unknown assailant who nearly de-
capitated him with a fire axe.1l4 However, because the vessel car-
ried 12 passengers (as to which the shipowner owes no warranty 
of seaworthiness) each of whom could have been the murderer, 
breach of warranty was not established.1l5 However, the court 
acknowledged the district court finding that the attacker had a 
vicious and savage character such that it could render the ship 
unseaworthy, if the assailant had been a crewmember.l16 
Serious injury was also apparent in Pashby, where plaintiff 
suffered severe injuries to his head, leg, and hand, after an un-
provoked assault by a deck hand wielding an 18" eyebolt.ll7 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's summary judgment.llS 
112. See e.g., Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99, 101-04 (6th Cir. 1978)(plain-
tiff hit on hip with pipe; evidence of provocation by the plaintiff and the assailant's good 
record did not support a finding of savage disposition); Smith v. American Mail Line, 
Ltd., 525 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1975)(fatal injury but plaintiff failed to establish injury 
inflicted by crewmember); Robinson v. S.S. Atlantic Sterling, 369 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 
1967)(plaintiff stabbed in stomach, but provoked his assailant); McConville v. Florida 
Towing Corp., 321 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1963)(intoxicated plaintiff provoked fight); 
Connolly v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1959)(plaintiff advanced on assail-
ant with broken bottle); Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1954)(bro-
ken hip was not the usual result in this type of assault); Monplaisir v. Delta S.S. Lines, 
1983 A.M.C. 649 (N.D. Cal. 1983)(both parties willingly entered into knife fight causing 
suspension of papers); Descendia v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 1975 A.M.C. 1403, 1407 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975)(cut to lower lip; plaintiff was aggressor); Gulledge v. United States, 1972 
A.M.C. 1187 (E.D. Penn. 1972)(twenty-three stitches required for head cuts; strong infer-
ence of plaintiff returning to start second fight). 
113. 525 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1975). 
114. Id. at 1149. 
115. Id. 
116.Id. 
117. Pashby, 608 F.2d at 1313. 
118. Id. at 1314. For other cases involving serious injury, see Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. 
S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 337 (1955)(severe head injuries, medical treatment required); 
Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985)(stab wound in back 
requiring 12 days hospitalization; recurring pshycological problems); Calcagni v. Hudson 
Waterways Corp., 630 F.2d 1049, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979)(multiple bruises and lacerations) 
Stechcon v. United States, 439 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1971)(cut to eye requiring 
stitches); Horton v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 326 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1964)(injuries 
resulting from severe beating required shoreside hospitalization); Clevenger v. Star Fish 
21
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However, where the physical injury is non-existent, unre-
ported for a significant period of time, or only requiring slight 
medical attention, the inference of unequal disposition is less. In 
Watson, x-rays showed injury had occurred prior to the fight in 
question and the plaintiff's unseaworthiness claim was ulti-
mately dismissed,119 A similar result was also reached in Boorus, 
where no injury was apparent or reported during the voyage.120 
In Kirsch v. United States,l21 plaintiff was hit twice but no seri-
ous injury was reported. Plaintiff was able to work the rest of 
the voyage, and judgment for plaintiff was ultimately 
reversed.122 
In sum, it appears the Ninth Circuit is looking for some 
type of serious injury before considering breach of warranty. Ad-
ditionally, for reasons stated earlier under "Analogy to criminal 
aggravated assault", supra, the nature of the injury is a critically 
important factor in the proper analysis of the unseaworthiness 
claim. 
3. Prior and subsequent acts or conditions. In proving the 
unequal disposition of the assailant, prior or subsequent acts of 
violence, belligerence, or excessive intoxication, may infer une-
qual disposition at the time of the assault.123 The weight given 
& Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397, 398 (5th Cir. 1963)(two ribs severed and punctured lung); 
Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 516 (2d Cir. 1952)(serious injury to 
head); The Rolph, 299 F. 52 (9th Cir. 1924)(injury to eyes and permanent injury); Hilde-
brand v. 8.8. Commander, 247 F. 8upp. 625, 626 (E.D. Va. 1965)(front tooth knocked 
out, requiring shoreside treatment); Handley v. United 8tates, 157 F. 8upp. 616, 618 
(8.D.N.Y. 1962)(stab wound to abdomen; three weeks hospitalization); Thompson v. 
Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. 8upp. 838, 841 (D.N.J. 1954)(near fatal blow to head; recurring 
neuropsychiatric problems). 
119. Watson, 135 F. 8upp. at 934. 
120. Boorus, 299 F.2d at 896. 
121. 450 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1971). 
122. See also Lambert v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 677 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 
1982)(plaintiff kicked in knee during fight); 8tankiewicz v. United Fruit 8.8. Corp., 229 
F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1956)(plaintiff hit in eye with jacket zipper); Monplaisir v. Delta 
8.8. Lines, 1983 A.M.C. 649 (N.D. Cal. 1983)(no physical injury pleaded); Palmer v. Apex 
Marine Corp., 510 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Wash. 1981)(finger bitten during fight); Kuhl v. 
Manhattan Tankers Co., 1972 A.M.C. 238, 240 (E.D. Va. 1972)(plaintiff hit once in face 
with fist; no medical attention sought or given). 
123. In BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 1, at 3-257, the authors state that 
"[t]he courts are somewhat reluctant, except in the most extreme cases, to allow the jury 
to infer from the nature of the assault itself that the assailant had a violent disposition; 
additional proof of prior acts in support thereof is usually necessary." 
In addition to prior acts, subsequent acts have also been examined. See Boudoin v. 
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such evidence has varied within the Ninth Circuit. 
In Boorus, and Palmer, the courts found no evidence of 
prior quarrelsome behavior by the assailant, ultimately ruling in 
the shipowner's favor.124 However, in Kirsch, the court found ev-
idence of three prior fist fights and one subsequent to the as-
sault on plaintiff, yet reversed judgment for plaintiff.121> Then in 
Stech con, where there was no evidence of quarrelsome history, 
but the assailant attacked from the rear without provocation re-
quiring stitches to the eye, summary judgment for defendant 
was reversed.126 
The varying weight given prior and subsequent acts in the 
above cases appears to parallel closely the severity of the injury 
and lack of provocation.127 A similar trend can be observed in 
other circuits where evidence of prior and subsequent acts are 
introduced.128 
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 338 (1955)(after the assault, assailant left the vessel 
against orders and was subsequently placed in irons and later discharged); Kirsch v. 
United States, 405 F.2d 326, 327 (9th Cir. 1971)(assailant had history of three prior fist 
fights and one subsequent to assault on plaintiff); Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 
F.Supp. 625, 627 (E.D. Va. 1965)(assailant pulled knife on chief mate after assaulting 
second mate). 
For admission of prior and subsequent acts see generally 22 C. WRIGHT AND K GRA-
HAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5242, at 487 (1978). 
124. Boorus, 299 F.2d at 896. Palmer, 510 F. Supp. at 73. 
125. Kirsch, 450 F.2d at 327. 
126. Stechcon, 439 F.2d at 794. 
127. See, e.g., Kirsch v. United States, 450 F.2d 326, 327 (9th Cir. 1971)(plaintiff 
able to work rest of voyage after apparently unprovoked attack); Stechcon v. United 
States, 439 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1971)(attack unprovoked, stitches to eye required); Boorus 
v. WestCoast Trans-Oceanic, 299 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1962}(both parties protagonists; 
no injury reported to ship's officers); Palmer v. Apex Marine Corp., 510 F. Supp. 72, 73-
74 (W.D. Wash. 1981)(both protagonists; plaintiff suffered injury to finger); Watson v. 
Letitia Lykes, 135 F. Supp. 933, 934 (S.D. Cal. 1955)(plaintiff the aggressor; nominal 
injuries). 
128. See, e.g., Lambert v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 677 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 
1982)(assailant had minor criminal record; parties had roomed together for a week with 
out complaint or incident); Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir. 
1978)(assailant was a licenced officer for twenty-six years, never a complaint, never lost 
his temper, highly regarded by crew, no prior problems with plaintiff); Robinson v. S.S. 
Atlantic Sterling, 369 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1967)(assailant was a quiet, peaceful and 
efficient man); Gerald v. United States Lines, 368 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1966)(no evidence of 
prior violent conduct by either parties); Horton v. Moore-McCormack Lines Inc., 326 
F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964)(assailant had previously attacked and bitten another crew mem-
ber); McConville v. Florida Towing Corp., 321 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1963)(plaintiff had 
struck the assailant nine months before; assailant was not quarrelsome nor prone to 
fighting; had tried to avoid the fight); Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 
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Additionally, evidence of contrition has appeared in two 
early Second Circuit cases as a significant mitigating act.129 Ap-
parently, having offered apologies had some influence in con-
cluding the assailant was of equal disposition.130 Although lip 
service has been paid to contrition as a factor in subsequent 
cases it has not reappeared as a significant factor .131 
4. Intoxication. The assailant's severe drunken state in 
Boudoin was one of several important factors the Court consid-
ered in upholding the unseaworthiness claim.132 The Ninth Cir-
cuit has followed Boudoin and examined the influence of intoxi-
cants in assault cases. 
191 (2d Cir. 1962)(one prior conviction for assault in last 20 years); Connolly v. Farrell 
Lines Inc., 268 F.2d 653, 655 (1st Cir. 1959)(evidence of log entry declaring assailant 
unfit for duty due to intoxication; a knife was also found under his pillow but no other 
indications of any problems); Stankiewicz v. United Fruit S.S. Corp., 229 F.2d 580, 581 
(2d Cir. 1956)(plaintiff testified that assailant was belligerent, loud, argumentative and 
started fights, including two previous ones); Kelcy v. Tankers Co., 217 F.2d 543, 544 (2d 
Cir. 1954)(assailant had a prior conviction and had served time for assault with a 
weapon; assailant chased the plaintiff out of the galley with a knife two days prior; after 
assault the assailant threatened chief mate with ax); Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 
F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1953)(parties on friendly terms four months prior to assault; no 
evidence of unusual truculence except for the assault); Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 
194 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1952)(plaintiff tried to submit evidence of assailant's quarrel-
someness and prior history at trial; judgment for defendant reversed and new trial or-
dered); Descendia v. American Export Lines, 1975 A.M.C. 1403, 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975)(parties had shared same quarters for three months without incident; plaintiff 
placed in brig for assault); Gulledge v. United States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187, 1188 (E.D. Pa. 
1972)(plaintiff said to be argumentative several hours before attack; testimony that as-
sailant was a quiet, peaceable man, who did not argue or look for trouble); Kuhl v. Man-
hattan Tankers Co., 1972 A.M.C. 236, 239 (E.D. Va. 1972)(no previous problems with 
chief mate on prior voyages); Fletcher v. Keystone Tankship Corp., 1970 A.M.C. 1812, 
1814 (S.D. Tex. 1970)(plaintiff suffering delusion of alleged homosexual advances); Hil-
debrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 F. Supp. 625, 626 (E.D. Va. 1965)(assailant had previ-
ously made threatening gestures to another seaman; plaintiff had known assailant for 
years with no differences); Handley v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 616, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 
1958)(assailant characterized as bully with pugnacious character, who frequently dis-
played and threatened to use his knife; assailant had threatened other third mate and 
challenged him to a fight; master testified that assailant said he would kill plaintiff if he 
did not leave the vessel); Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D.N.J. 
1954)(assailant was later convicted for the assault). 
129. Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 191, 192 (2d Cir. 1962)(as-
sailant repented; sought to aid plaintiff by wiping his face with a towel); Jones v. Lykes 
Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1953)(assailant showed contrition after beating 
plaintiff). 
130. Jones, 204 F.2d at 817; Walters, 309 F.2d at 192-94. 
131. See Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.D. Va. 1965), 
where contrition listed as a factor. 
132. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 338. 
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In Boorus, evidence was introduced that the assailant was 
intoxicated at the time of the assault.133 However, plaintiff failed 
to substantially corroborate the evidence and the court ulti-
mately affirmed judgment for defendant.134 In Stechcon, noting 
among other factors an absence of intoxication, the court re-
versed summary judgment for defendant.13C> In Palmer, the bo-
sun's drunkenness was found not to be the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries.136 
However, in the case of heavy or excessive intoxication, 
Boudoin and other circuit decisions have found a strong infer-
ence of unequal disposition. The court in Handley v. United 
States/37 found the assailant had consumed 4 to 6 scotches 
before stabbing the plaintiff on a dock.13s In Claborn v. Star 
Fish & Oyster CO./39 the assailant had been drinking heavily for 
several days causing the captain to tie him to the stern shortly 
before his fatal attack on plaintiff's deceased with a 10" bait 
knife.l4O The court found the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of 
law.l41 
Although intoxication has been examined by the Ninth Cir-
cuit it has yet to be utilized as a strong indication of unequal 
disposition. Boudoin and some circuit decisions suggest that 
heavy or excessive intoxication is needed before it becomes a sig-
nificant factor.142 Smaller amounts of alcohol consumed prior to 
an assault appear to carry little weight.l43 
133. Boorus, 299 F.2d at 894. 
134. Id. at 897. 
135. Stechcon, 439 F.2d at 794. 
136. Palmer, 510 F. Supp. at 74. 
137. 157 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
138. Id. at 618. 
139. 578 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1978). 
140. Id. at 984-85. 
141. Id. at 987. 
142. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 337. See also McConville v. Florida Towing Corp., 321 
F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1963)(assailant was heavily intoxicated at time of assault); Keen v. 
Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 516 (2d Cir. 1952)(assailant drunk when as-
saulted plaintiff with a meat cleaver); Montanez v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 1972 
A.M.C. 1251, 1252 (E.D. Pa. 1972)(assailant visibly intoxicated). 
143. For cases dealing with smaller amounts of alcohol see Lambert v. Morania Oil 
Tanker Corp., 677 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1982)(assailant had consumed a couple beers 
ashore prior to assault); Gerald v. United States Lines, 368 F.2d 343, 344 (2d Cir. 
1966)(assailant and possibly plaintiff had been drinking beer prior to assault); Jones v. 
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1953)(assailant and plaintiff each had a 
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5. Weapons. The Ninth Circuit as well as the Supreme 
Court and other circuits have consistently viewed the use of 
dangerous or deadly weapons as a critical factor in determining 
unseaworthiness.144 Plaintiff's deceased in Smith v. American 
Mail Line, was fatally attacked with fire ax, but plaintiff could 
not establish that a crewmember was the assailant.l45 Judgment 
for defendant was affirmed.l4S In Pashby, the assailant attacked 
plaintiff from the rear with an 18" eyebolt causing severe inju-
ries.147 Defendant's summary judgment was reversed.l4S Also, 
even where an instrument is used in the everyday work place it 
may be viewed as a weapon depending on the manner of use.149 
can of beer earlier in the evening); Gulledge v. United States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187, 1188 
(E.D. Pa. 1972)(some evidence of prior intoxication, but several hours before). 
144. See, e.g., Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U$. 336, 337 (1955)(assailant 
attacked plaintiff with a bottle); Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 824 
(11th Cir. 1985)(stabbed in back); Calcagni v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 630 F.2d 1049, 
1051 (2d Cir. 1979)(assailant hit plaintiff with wheel wrench); Claborn v. Star Fish & 
Oyster Co., 578 F.2d 983, 985 (5th Cir. 1978)(fatal stabbing with 10" bait knife); Harbin 
v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99, 102 (6th Cir. 1978)(assault with pipe); Robinson v. 
Atlantic Sterling, 369 F.2d 69, 70 (5th Cir. 1967)(plaintiff stabbed in stomach with 
knife); Gerald v. United States Lines, 368 F.2d 343, 344 (2d Cir. 1966)(assailant attacked 
with knife; plaintiff knocked assailant out with a piece of dunnage); Smith v. ,Lauritzen, 
356 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1966)(assailant attacks plaintiff with cargo hooks); Horton v. 
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964)(assailant attacked plaintiff 
with a bottle, broken glass and his teeth); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 
397, 398 (5th Cir. 1963)(attack with a steel bar 4'x I" with sharp point); McConville v. 
Florida Towing Corp., 321 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1963)(alleged assailant defended him-
self with an "iron dog"); Connolly v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 653, 655 (1st Cir. 
1959)(assailant hit plaintiff over the head with a plank while plaintiff was advancing on 
him with a broken bottle); Stankiewicz v. United Fruit S.S. Corp., 229 F.2d 580, 581 (2d 
Cir. 1956)(assailant hits plaintiff in eye with zipper attached to jacket); Keen v. Overseas 
Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 516 (2d Cir. 1952)(assailant assaults plaintiff with meat 
cleaver); Monplaisir v. Delta S.S. Lines, 1983 A.M.C. 694, 695 (N.D. Cal. 1983)(assault 
with knife, but plaintiff is proximate cause of his own injury); Descendia v. American 
Export Lines, 1975 A.M.C. 1403, 1405 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)(plaintiff slashed alleged assail-
ant's hand with scissors); Gulledge v. United States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187, 1190 (E.D. Pa. 
1972)(plaintiff claims assailant hit him over the head with a coffee mug); Handley v. 
United States, 157 F. Supp. 616, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)(assailant stabbed plaintiff with 
knife); Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D.N.J. 1954)(attack with 
meat cleaver). 
145. Smith v. American Mail Line, 525 F.2d at 1149. 
146. [d. at 1151. 
147. Pashby, 608 F.2d at 1313. 
148. [d. at 1314. 
149. See generally Smith v. Lauritzen, 356 F.2d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 1966)(focus is on 
the dangerous nature of the instrument (cargo hooks) when used as a weapon); Gulledge 
v. United States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1972)(plaintiff alleges a coffee mug was 
used to committ assault causing twenty-three stitches to his head). 
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The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have ruled under certain 
circumstances, an assault with a weapon may render the vessel 
unseaworthy as a matter of law. In the Fifth Circuit case of 
Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster CO./50 the mate who was in 
command of the vessel during unloading operations savagely 
plunged a 4' x 1" sharpened "devils fork," into the back of 
deckhand after an exchange of words.151 The assault punctured a 
lung and severed two ribs.152 Reversing the district court ruling 
for defendant, the court held, as a matter of law, the vessel to be 
unseaworthy.153 
Several years later the Fifth Circuit in Claborn, again ruled 
the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law. 1M In Claborn, a delir-
ious deckhand in an extraordinarily savage and unprovoked at-
tack fatally stabbed plaintiff's deceased in the back with a 10" 
bait knife.155 The Fifth Circuit reversed a lower court judgment 
for defendant finding the facts demonstrated the assailant to be 
unequally disposed, thus breaching the shipowner's warranty of 
seaworthiness as matter of law.15s 
More recently the Eleventh Circuit in Deakle v. John E. 
Graham & Sons/57 ruled that the facts established the vessel 
unseaworthy as a matter of law.158 In Deakle, the assailant 
deckhand apparently went berserk stabbing the captain in the 
back in an unprovoked attack.159 The plaintiff was granted a di-
rected verdict and defendant appealed. ISO The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the lower court ruling finding the vessel unseaworthy as 
a matter of law. lSI 
6. Physical differences. A more subtle distinction examined 
by the Ninth Circuit and other circuits are physical differences 
150. 325 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1963). 
151. Id. at 398. 
152.Id. 
153. Id. at 402-03. 
154. Claborn, 578 F.2d at 987. 
155. Id. at 985. 
156. Id. at 987. See also Pashby v. Universal Dredging Corp., 608 F.2d 1312, 1314 
(9th Cir. 1979), citing to Claborn, 578 F.2d. at 987. 
157. 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985). 
158. Id. at 826. 
159. Id. at 824. 
160.Id. 
161. Id. at 826. 
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including age and size, between the assailant and victim. In 
Stechcon, the assailant, who attacked from the rear without 
warning was 75 lbs. heavier than his victim.162 Considering the 
weight disparity along with the unprovoked nature of the attack 
and injury to the eye, the reviewing court ultimately reversed 
defendant's summary judgment.163 
The Second Circuit in Kelcy v. Tankers Corp.,164 found the 
trial court's ruling on unseaworthiness was justified noting the 
plaintiff was 56 years old and no match physically against his 25 
year old assailant.16l1 In Harbin v. Interlake S.S. CO./66 plaintiff 
was 47 years old at 6'1", 215 Ibs.167 His alleged assailant, 38 
years old, was shorter and lighter.16B In reversing plaintiff's judg-
ment, the Sixth Circuit in addition to other considerations, ap-
peared to use age and size as offsetting factors.169 
In sum, when age or size is examined as a significant factor 
the differences have been substantial,l1° However, it is apparent 
that some caution should be exercised in the amount of weight 
given such differences as a smaller, older person may be equally 
capable of viciously assaulting a fellow crew member. 
7. Self-defense. Generally, the focus of the affirmative de-
fense of self defense is on the reasonableness of the force used to 
repel. l7l The Ninth Circuit as well as other circuits have also 
162. Stechcon, 439 F.2d at 794. See also The Rolph, 229 F. 52 (9th Cir. 1924)(assail-
ant was a large and powerful man). 
163. Id. at 794. 
164. 217 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1954). 
165. Id. at 543 n.4. 
166. 570 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1978). 
167. Id. at 101. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 101-04. 
170. For cases in other circuits where size and weight have been considered, see 
Lambert v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 677 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1982)(plaintiff 6'3", 275 
lbs.; assailant 5'8",145 lbs.); Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 191, 192 
(2d Cir. 1962)(plaintiff 30 lbs. lighter than assailant); McConville v. Florida Towing 
Corp., 321 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1963)(alleged assailant a much smaller man; court con-
cludes plaintiff was aggressor); Handley v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 
1958)(assailant 6'2", 250 lbs.; plaintiff 5'7", 170 lbs.). 
171. See FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 65 at § 81.02, at 197: 
Self-Defense - Burden of Proof on Defendant 
In addition to denying that any assault or battery by the 
defendant proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, the de-
fendant alleges that any act or conduct of the defendant which 
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focused on the plaintiff's lack of self defense as a factor, signifi-
cantly where the assailant continues his attack.172 
In Stechcon, plaintiff offered no defense to an unprovoked 
rear attack.I73 Considering all relevant factors the circuit court 
reversed defendant's summary judgment.174 However, in Kirsch, 
the circuit court reversed judgment for plaintiff even though he 
offered no defense to an assault by the third assistant 
engineer.I7l1 
may have caused any injury or damage to the plaintiff, at the 
time and place alleged, was committed or done following an 
unprovoked assault by the plaintiff upon the person of the 
defendant. 
A person upon whom an unprovoked assault is being 
made, or who has reasonable ground for believing, and does 
believe, that another person is about to inflict bodily injury 
upon him, need not retreat, but may stand his ground and de-
fend the integrity of his person; and where in such self-defense 
of his person he injures his assailant, the law holds there is 
legal justification, provided he used no more or greater force 
or means than he in fact believed to be reasonably necessary, 
and would appear to a reasonable person, under like circum-
stance, to be necessary, in order to prevent bodily injury to 
himself. 
Self-defense is an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's 
claim, and the burden of proving this defense, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in the case, is on the defendant. 
See also Lambert v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 677 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1982)(plaintiff 
forces off his aggressor); Robinson v. S.S. Atlantic Sterling, 369 F.2d 69, 70 (5th Cir. 
1967)(plaintiff drew pistol and fired on his assailant after stabbing); Smith v. Lauritzen, 
356 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1966)(assailant claims self defense in attacking plaintiff with 
cargo hooks after verbal exchange); Gerald v. United States Lines, 368 F.2d 343, 344 (2d 
Cir. 1966)(plaintiff knocked assailant out with piece of dunnage after being slashed with 
a knife); Connolly v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 653, 654 (1st Cir. 1959)(plaintiff armed 
himself with a broken bottle and advanced on alleged assailant); Gulledge v. United 
States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187, 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1972)(assailant claimed he hit plaintiff once 
with coffee mug in self defense); Fletcher v. Keystone Tankship Corp., 1970 A.M.C. 1812, 
1813 (S.D. Tex. 1970)(no justification for fatally shooting alleged assailant). 
172. See Stechcon v. United States, 439 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1971)(plaintiff of-
fered no defense to unprovoked attack); Bartholomew v. Universe Tankers, Inc., 168 F. 
Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)(no defense to beating); Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. 
Supp. 838 (D. N.J. 1954)(no defense to attack with meat cleaver). 
However, in some cases even where there is a lack of self-defense, ultimate judgment 
in shipowner's favor has been granted. See Kirsch v. United States, 450 F.2d 326, 327 
(9th Cir. 1971)(plaintiff did not try to strike back after being hit by his assailant); Wal-
ters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 326 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964)(no defense to beating by 
larger man). 
173. Stechcon, 439 F.2d at 794. 
174. [d. at 795. 
175. Kirsch, 450 F.2d at 327. 
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The different results in Stech con and Kirsch could perhaps 
again be better explained by the nature of the resulting injury. 
In Kirsch, no apparent medical attention was necessary and he 
was able to work the rest of the voyage.I'16 In Stechcon, plaintiff 
received injury to his eye requiring medical attention and 
stitches.I'1'1 Therefore, within the Ninth Circuit a lack of self de-
fense may be view as a weightier factor depending on the seri-
ousness of the injury. 
8. Warning. Closely related to provocation and self-defense, 
is the issue of lack of warning by the assailant before attack. A 
lack of warning prior to attack would appear to be a strong in-
ference of a violent nature. In Stechcon, the assailant attacked 
without warning from the rear causing injury to the eye.l'1S In 
Pashby, the assailant attacked without warning from the rear 
with an 18" eyebolt causing severe injury.I'19 In both cases de-
fendant's summary judgment was reversed. ISO Other circuits 
have also used a lack of warning as a factor in determining 
disposition.lsl 
Naturally, expressed warnings are also viewed as significant 
evidence of disposition as found in Handley and Calcagni v. 
Hudson Waterways Corp.182 In Handley, the district court con-
sidered evidence that the assailant told the master he would kill 
plaintiff if the plaintiff did not leave the ship. ISS The assailant 
subsequently stabbed the plaintiff on the pier.184 Viewing the to-
176. Id. at 327 . 
. 177. Stechcon, 439 F.2d at 794. 
178. Id. at 794. 
179. iPashby, 608 F.2d at 1313. 
180. iStechcon, 439 F.2d at 795; Pashby, 608 F.2d at 1314. 
181. See, e.g., Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955)(plaintiff awoke 
and was attacked with bottle in unprovoked and sudden assault); Deakle v. John E. Gra-
ham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985)(unprovoked rear attack with knife; no warn-
ing); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1970)(rear attack with 
"devils fork"; no defense); Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1953)(sud-
den assault; no apparent provocation other than verbal exchange several hours earlier; 
judgment for plaintiff reversed); Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 
1952)(rear attack with meat cleaver; no apparent warning); Hildebrand v. S.S. Com-
mander, 247 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Va. 1965)(sudden unprovoked attack; no warning); 
Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D. N.J. 1954)(rear attack with meat 
cleaver; no warning; no defense). 
182. 603 F.2d 1049, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979). 
183. Handley, 157 F. Supp. at 617-19. 
184. Id. at 617. 
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tality of the circumstances, the court concluded that the assail-
ant possessed an unequal disposition.181> 
A similar result is seen in Calcagni, where the assailant, the 
third engineer, threatened to kill plaintiff while chasing him up 
a ladder and striking him with a wheel wrench.186 On appeal the 
Second Circuit found the trial court was not in error for submit-
ting the unseaworthiness claim to the jury.18? 
9. Conduct of officers. Case law from other circuits suggest 
the conduct of superiors should be of a higher caliber than the 
ordinary crew.188 This seems a reasonable enough proposition 
considering the power that superiors possess aboard the 
vessel.l89 
In the Ninth Circuit, superior/inferior positions have been 
examined as a factor in the unseaworthiness claim. Affirming 
judgment for defendant, the court in Boorus noted plaintiff bo-
sun had no authority over the carpenter, his alleged assailant.190 
However, analysis utilizing this factor has not been consistent. 
In Kirsch, the third assistant engineer assaulted the chief stew-
ard.191 In reversing plaintiff's judgment, the reviewing court 
never analyzed the assailant's position as a licensed officer.192 
Cases from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits suggest that 
superiors should be held to a higher standard of conduct. In 
Clevenger, emphasis was placed on the commanding position of 
the assailant at the time of assault in finding the vessel was un-
185. [d. at 618. 
186. Calcagni, 603 F.2d at 1051-52. See also Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 578 
F.2d 983, 984 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (assailant stated that plaintiff's decedent was "one of 
them" as he grabbed for the bait knife, which was taken away). 
187. [d. at 1051. 
188. See Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 578 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1978)(agree-
ing with the reasoning of Clevenger that the command position implies a higher stand of 
conduct); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1963)(mate was 
commanding officer at time of his assault on deck hand); Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 
247 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.n. Va. 1965)(Uwe think that other officers and members of a 
crew of a vessel have the right to expect that the character and behavior of an officer will 
be somewhat better than that of an ordinary seaman"). 
189. See supra note 30. 
190. Boorus, 299 F.2d at 894. 
191. Kirsch, 450 F.2d at 327. 
192. [d. 
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seaworthy as a matter of law.193 Similarly, in Hildebrand v. S.S. 
Commander,194 where the third mate assaulted the second mate 
in an unprovoked attack, the district court stated "[i]n short, we 
think that other officers and members of a crew of a vessel have 
the right to expect that the character and behavior of an officer 
will be somewhat better than that of an ordinary seaman.m91> 
Although the Ninth Circuit as well as other circuits have 
shown inconsistencies in the examination of superiors assaulting 
inferiors, the reasoning of Clevenger and Hildebrand appear 
sound and should be applied in a consistent manner within the 
Ninth Circuit.196 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although advances in modern ship design have made vessels 
more comfortable, nothing has changed their character as float-
ing steel islands. By tradition and necessity most seamen are 
locked into an inherently hazardous environment over which 
they have little control. The admiralty courts have long recog-
nized these hazardous conditions and have sought to protect the 
seaman's risk of loss under certain conditions through the doc-
trine of unseaworthiness. The doctrine will impose strict liability 
on the shipowner for injuries resulting from defects in the vessel 
including a defective crew member. In determining if a seaman 
is defective we must distinguish between the equally and un-
equally disposed seaman. 
In attempting to clarify the issues arising in determination 
of the unseaworthiness claim for assault, the authors set forth 
193. Clevenger, 325 F.2d at 398. See also supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
194. 247 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.D. Va. 1965). 
195. Id. at 628. 
196. For fact situations or discussion of officers assaulting fellow crew members in 
other circuits, see Calcagni v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 630 F.2d 1049, 1051 (2d Cir. 
1979)(third assistant assaults crew member with wrench); Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster 
Co., 578 F.2d 983, 986 (5th Cir. 1978)(a higher command position will invoke a higher 
standard of conduct); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397, 398 (5th Cir. 
1963)(mate assaults deck hand with "devils fork"); Handley v. United States, 157 F. 
Supp. 616, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)(assault between licensed officers, judgment for plaintiff 
affirmed). But see Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1978)(second assis-
tant allegedly assaults fireman; court appears to discount their relative positions, focuses 
on assailant's good record and reputation instead). 
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two preliminary suggestions. First, an analogy to aggravated as-
sault may be drawn in focusing attention not only on the mental 
state or disposition of the seaman, but also the nature of the 
resulting physical injury incurred by the victim. Case law sug-
gests that a strong inference of unseaworthiness may be drawn 
where serious bodily injury is found. 
Second, recognizing that the plaintiff has a heavy burden in 
establishing that a fellow crewmember is of unequal disposition, 
Judge Hand's unfortunate caricature of fighting seamen should 
be discarded in judging the equal disposition of today's seaman. 
The stereotype of fighting seamen adds nothing objective in at-
tempting to reach a rational determination and only serves to 
confuse the issues at hand. 
From a comprehensive analysis of the relevant case law the 
authors suggest using the proposed guideposts as a checklist in 
reviewing individual circumstances of the case. Decisions in this 
area suggests that serious bodily injury or death, lack of justifia-
ble provocation, and use of a weapon are extremely weighty fac-
tors to consider. The authors propose that the Ninth Circuit 
should adopt the reasoning of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in 
ruling a vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law where the above 
three factors are found in combination. 
In addition to the remaining factors of prior and subsequent 
acts, intoxication, physical differences, and warning, the Ninth 
Circuit should focus particular attention on the conduct of 
licenced officers when assaulting fellow crewmembers. Licensed 
officers hold a commanding position and nearly absolute author-
ity over unlicensed seamen in the closed ship board environ-
ment. Penalties for disobedience can be severe. As such, the 
Ninth Circuit should consistently hold licensed officers to a 
higher standard of conduct in determining equal disposition. 
In sum, the authors have attempted to chart out a few rec-
ognized landmarks or guideposts with suggested aids in navigat-
ing the unseaworthiness claim for assaults between crew mem-
bers. In addition, the prudent navigator should always consider 
any local conditions or circumstances that might affect his posi-
tion before setting the course. 
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